Rob's Politics Blog

An earthquake of unprecedented scale has rocked the EU over the past month. By any account, it began with the French rejection of the Union's constitution. At the least, the current row over the Union's budget is a powerful aftershock. It may be an equal or greater temblor altogether.

At times of greatest stress, Jacques Chirac goes ahead and vents. A political leader of middling caliber, who won reelection in 2002 primarily because his opponent was an avowed racist, he is, yet, fully the Gaullist. The political ability of Charles de Gaulle has been much celebrated, but I think we forget how often the general blundered and then fulminated. Both Chirac and de Gaulle make use of the political tantrum. Both subscribe to the delusion of France somehow standing atop a pyramid formed by the other European states, triumphantly battling an Anglo-Saxon colossus and undoing the humiliations of 1940 or perhaps Agincourt. The Gaullist method has been regnant in France since the fall of the Fourth Republic and it has fostered perhaps the most astringent political culture in Europe. Jacques Chirac is too mediocre to have invented the Gaullist tantrum. When he tells Eastern European leaders that they were not brought up well, or calls Tony Blair pathetic, he is merely a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the stage.

The issue at question is emblematic of the faltering EU: Tony Blair refused to concede Britain's agricultural rebate without a commensurate reduction by France of its own agricultural subsidy. For decades, France has claimed the lion's share of agricultural subsidies, protecting a sector that other countries (like Britain) were forced to reform decades ago. France has long acted as though it was above the rules; several years back, it gave itself special permission to have a budget deficit. The seamless conflation of European interests with French interests has gone on for decades. No longer. As Blair put it,

I'm afraid I'm not prepared to have someone tell me that theirs is the only view of what Europe is. Europe isn't owned by anybody. Europe is owned by all of us.

The era of Chirac is ending. Gerhard Schroeder is in deep trouble and is likely to lose to the more Atlanticist Angela Merkel. Germany may return to its prior role as a continental balancer between Britain and France, just as the future of the EU is on the line.

What is the future of the EU? This timely Observer editorial makes plain that it may lie with Tony Blair. In his last term, Blair may yet have the chance to profoundly shape the future of the entire continent. Britain has been an outsider to the European integration process for decades; during the 1950s it remained outside, while attempting to devise looser alternatives to political integration. In 1963, de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application to join the then-Common Market. Since then, Britain has been the largest of the EU latecomers.

What may emerge from this mess is an EU that more conforms with the older British vision of Europe as a looser confederation of nation-states. This offers a less rigid structure than the French vision - and one that might allow the Union to be broadened to outliers like Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. A broader Union might prove more fertile ground for creating lasting transnational institutions. It may be a longshot - since Chirac won't be leaving the picture anytime soon, but Britain's impending European presidency may offer London its best chance to shape the future of Europe - ever.

Former gulag inmate Pavel Litvinov's essay in the Washington Post provides a useful corrective to Amnesty International's hyperbolic assertion that Guantanamo constitutes the gulag of our age. When one compares the scale, intent, and operation of the two systems, the uselessness of the analogy is even more apparent. Moreover, there's something offensive in such casual use of the gulag as a metaphor. These kinds of analogies are a two way street. As often as not, they cheapen the event being invoked more than they elevate our understanding of its contemporary counterpart.
Litvinov recounts the following conversation with an Amnesty staffer:

"Don't you think that there's an enormous difference?" I asked him.
"Sure," he said, "but after all, it attracts attention to the problem of Guantanamo detainees."

At a time when the Bush administration is being accused of exaggerating the evidence that Iraq possessed WMD, it's a little embarrassing to see Amnesty producing its own brand of hype. As Litvinov argues, Amnesty does the greatest damage to itself - allowing it to be publicly dismissed as politically biased by the Bush administration. Hyperbole undermines one's own credibility, whether one is arguing for a war or against a detainment system. Critics of the Bush administration would do well to avoid employing its own methods.

It looks to be a long four years under the erratic guidance of Dr. Dean.

Unsurprisingly, I'm annoyed at Dean's recent remarks. Declaring Tom DeLay guilty before the Hammer is judged by a jury of his peers seems a mite headstrong. It seems worse if one remembers that Dean hasn't always been so keen on prejudging trial outcomes. Back in 2003, he remarked:

I will have this old-fashioned notion that even with people like Osama, who is very likely to be found guilty, we should do our best not to, in positions of executive power, not to prejudge jury trials.

Not the sort of thing that plays well in Peoria. One can either hold to the principle or pretend that they're another Nancy Grace. Doing both looks hypocritical.

As to Dean's remarks about Republicans, well what is there to say? Yes the GOP is dominated by the religious right and the wealthy, but what benefit is there to be had by saying that Republicans have "never made an honest living in their lives"? How does that advance Dean's great project of building a 50 state party? You know, the one he thinks he's discovered.

The role of party chairman bears more financial and ceremonial importance than it does political authority. Nonetheless, Dean will be in a position of visibility for years to come and he would do well to think less about "You go, girl!" moments and more about appealing to people turned off by gross characterizations and partisan mudflinging.

The murder of Samir Kassir illustrates one painful reality that Americans need to face about Lebanon: it is fairly likely to descend into violence if the standoff between pro-independence and pro-Syrian forces continues. The forces supporting Syria are too ruthless and too well armed to be cowed by students in Beirut. Hezbollah is lining up alongside the Syrians, and Bashar Assad will probably send back his army once he thinks the coast is clear - perhaps when another crisis is distracting the international community.

What follows is that international pressure serves as a necessary counterweight to the Syrians and perhaps to their Lebanese proxies. If Assad is informed that a return to Lebanon would prompt attacks on Syria itself, that may be sufficient to change the equation. The US and France have acted with reasonable cohesion on this issue.

One potential consequence over a Lebanese showdown is the end of the armistice between the US and Hezbollah. That will have serious consequences. Hezbollah pioneered mass terror while bin Laden was still hiding from the Red Army in Afghanistan. If fully aroused, they will bring an intact leadership structure and untapped resources to the jihadi struggle. While our enthusiasm for democracy in Lebanon is justifiable, and while we have good reason to oppose Syria, this fundamental fact needs to be remembered.

Every few months, one gets a timely reminder of why Pat Buchanan is such a loathsome individual. Last May he asked insipidly if opposing Hitler in World War II was "worth it." At the least, one might have hoped that he'd stay quiet for a few months, having vented his spleen.

The revelation of the identity of Deep Throat has once again given Buchanan occasion to remind us what a noxious guy he is. Oblivious to the damage wrought to the foundations of American democracy by the Nixon administration, Buchanan has only scorn for Mark Felt, comparing him to Linda Tripp. Right - using the White House to destroy political opponents is roughly the same as lying about sex. Oh yes, and

I'm willing to say that most conservatives are capable of being right at least once. Even the horrible Jesse Helms eventually came to support Third World debt relief. It beggars belief how consistently wrong Pat Buchanan has been over the years. Over the course of a long career, Buchanan opposed sanctions on South Africa, immigration into America, Vatican II, gay rights, and opposing Hitler and fascism. Oh yes, and the Vietnam Memorial. I will forever marvel that major news networks consider this despicable crank someone to invite over for panel discussions.

There is, I guess, some value in people seeing that folks like him are still out there. Moreover, there is even greater value in seeing Buchanan's frustrations. This country is moving in a direction that he loathes: toward greater tolerance and greater diversity. He is left an increasingly bitter spectator to a world that has largely rejected him.

This classic line from Van Halen seems apt when considering the results from the French and Dutch referenda on the EU constitution.

The French result was forecast in advance, but is still a shocker. It might have been closer, particularly after the government pulled out all the stops. Chirac has egg on his face, and it really couldn't have happened to a nicer guy. As the New York Times notes, his choice to replace Prime Minister Raffarin with Dominique de Villepin is an odd and probably desperate move. De Villepin is an aristocrat with no elective experience and a hard-on for Napoleon. The better choice for Chirac's party would have been Nicholas Sarkozy, the immensely popular former interior minister who is widely seen as Chirac's future successor. Alas, Chirac loathes Sarkozy with a passion seen most often in doddering Gauls.

The core problem in France is the economy. Clearly this vote had little or nothing to do with Chirac's foreign policy. It does, perhaps, indicate the extent to which Chirac used foreign policy to bind together an otherwise fractious electorate, while failing to resolve France's perennial economic crisis or uncertainty about Europe. As a result, his dream of assembling a European superpower with France at its head now stands irrelevantly off to the side, like a latter-day Maginot Line. Sarkozy's path to power is that much less cluttered. If and when he takes it, we can expect a less galling and more pragmatic line from France. Sarkozy, the child of Hungarian immigrants, is less intoxicated with Frenchness and more concerned with the need for economic and political reform in France. With a sufficient governing coalition, he could be a truly historic leader.

The Dutch result can be discussed more briefly. It is less surprising. While commentators have noted that the Netherlands was one of the core members of the European Coal & Steel Community - the forerunner to the EU - they miss the fact that it has always straddled between an Atlanticist and a European orientation, often choosing the former. The Netherlands has always needed access to German markets, but it has been historically wary of allowing itself to be dominated by Germany or France or the two acting in concert. For this reason, it has tended to support a larger British role on the continent. The Dutch supported us over Iraq, and they felt themselves ill-treated as the largest per-capita contributor to the EU. While France and Germany were allowed to run deficits, the Netherlands was forced into budget cuts by Brussels. Once the French vote was in, any doubt that they'd vote against the constitution was gone. France had broken ranks, enabling the smaller countries to follow in its wake.

What is next? Certainly Britain will retain its cold feet for the European project. Poland and the Czech Republic, the latter led by Euro-skeptic Vaclav Klaus, may feel freer to reject the treaty. Though Germany has already approved it, I wonder if France's rejection will leave Germans feeling that they have been left holding the bag. German anxieties about deepening integration are at least as profound as those of the French.

What may hopefully emerge from this mess is an EU premised on European integration without grandiose ambitions of European power. A Europe that accepts difference of opinion and accords more weight to its east and south promises to be a more equitable arrangement - one capable of bringing the grander dreams of integration to fruition at a later point. At the present time it seems clear that European peoples are not thrilled with the idea and certainly that they lack the caliber of leadership to bring it off. Chirac doesn't even come close to meeting the bar; the fact that he has been a leading advocate of deepening the EU shows how far the political classes of Europe have to go before they can be credible builders of transnational institutions.