Wednesday, June 01, 2005
Dream Another Dream, This Dream is Over
This classic line from Van Halen seems apt when considering the results from the French and Dutch referenda on the EU constitution.
The French result was forecast in advance, but is still a shocker. It might have been closer, particularly after the government pulled out all the stops. Chirac has egg on his face, and it really couldn't have happened to a nicer guy. As the New York Times notes, his choice to replace Prime Minister Raffarin with Dominique de Villepin is an odd and probably desperate move. De Villepin is an aristocrat with no elective experience and a hard-on for Napoleon. The better choice for Chirac's party would have been Nicholas Sarkozy, the immensely popular former interior minister who is widely seen as Chirac's future successor. Alas, Chirac loathes Sarkozy with a passion seen most often in doddering Gauls.
The core problem in France is the economy. Clearly this vote had little or nothing to do with Chirac's foreign policy. It does, perhaps, indicate the extent to which Chirac used foreign policy to bind together an otherwise fractious electorate, while failing to resolve France's perennial economic crisis or uncertainty about Europe. As a result, his dream of assembling a European superpower with France at its head now stands irrelevantly off to the side, like a latter-day Maginot Line. Sarkozy's path to power is that much less cluttered. If and when he takes it, we can expect a less galling and more pragmatic line from France. Sarkozy, the child of Hungarian immigrants, is less intoxicated with Frenchness and more concerned with the need for economic and political reform in France. With a sufficient governing coalition, he could be a truly historic leader.
The Dutch result can be discussed more briefly. It is less surprising. While commentators have noted that the Netherlands was one of the core members of the European Coal & Steel Community - the forerunner to the EU - they miss the fact that it has always straddled between an Atlanticist and a European orientation, often choosing the former. The Netherlands has always needed access to German markets, but it has been historically wary of allowing itself to be dominated by Germany or France or the two acting in concert. For this reason, it has tended to support a larger British role on the continent. The Dutch supported us over Iraq, and they felt themselves ill-treated as the largest per-capita contributor to the EU. While France and Germany were allowed to run deficits, the Netherlands was forced into budget cuts by Brussels. Once the French vote was in, any doubt that they'd vote against the constitution was gone. France had broken ranks, enabling the smaller countries to follow in its wake.
What is next? Certainly Britain will retain its cold feet for the European project. Poland and the Czech Republic, the latter led by Euro-skeptic Vaclav Klaus, may feel freer to reject the treaty. Though Germany has already approved it, I wonder if France's rejection will leave Germans feeling that they have been left holding the bag. German anxieties about deepening integration are at least as profound as those of the French.
What may hopefully emerge from this mess is an EU premised on European integration without grandiose ambitions of European power. A Europe that accepts difference of opinion and accords more weight to its east and south promises to be a more equitable arrangement - one capable of bringing the grander dreams of integration to fruition at a later point. At the present time it seems clear that European peoples are not thrilled with the idea and certainly that they lack the caliber of leadership to bring it off. Chirac doesn't even come close to meeting the bar; the fact that he has been a leading advocate of deepening the EU shows how far the political classes of Europe have to go before they can be credible builders of transnational institutions.
The French result was forecast in advance, but is still a shocker. It might have been closer, particularly after the government pulled out all the stops. Chirac has egg on his face, and it really couldn't have happened to a nicer guy. As the New York Times notes, his choice to replace Prime Minister Raffarin with Dominique de Villepin is an odd and probably desperate move. De Villepin is an aristocrat with no elective experience and a hard-on for Napoleon. The better choice for Chirac's party would have been Nicholas Sarkozy, the immensely popular former interior minister who is widely seen as Chirac's future successor. Alas, Chirac loathes Sarkozy with a passion seen most often in doddering Gauls.
The core problem in France is the economy. Clearly this vote had little or nothing to do with Chirac's foreign policy. It does, perhaps, indicate the extent to which Chirac used foreign policy to bind together an otherwise fractious electorate, while failing to resolve France's perennial economic crisis or uncertainty about Europe. As a result, his dream of assembling a European superpower with France at its head now stands irrelevantly off to the side, like a latter-day Maginot Line. Sarkozy's path to power is that much less cluttered. If and when he takes it, we can expect a less galling and more pragmatic line from France. Sarkozy, the child of Hungarian immigrants, is less intoxicated with Frenchness and more concerned with the need for economic and political reform in France. With a sufficient governing coalition, he could be a truly historic leader.
The Dutch result can be discussed more briefly. It is less surprising. While commentators have noted that the Netherlands was one of the core members of the European Coal & Steel Community - the forerunner to the EU - they miss the fact that it has always straddled between an Atlanticist and a European orientation, often choosing the former. The Netherlands has always needed access to German markets, but it has been historically wary of allowing itself to be dominated by Germany or France or the two acting in concert. For this reason, it has tended to support a larger British role on the continent. The Dutch supported us over Iraq, and they felt themselves ill-treated as the largest per-capita contributor to the EU. While France and Germany were allowed to run deficits, the Netherlands was forced into budget cuts by Brussels. Once the French vote was in, any doubt that they'd vote against the constitution was gone. France had broken ranks, enabling the smaller countries to follow in its wake.
What is next? Certainly Britain will retain its cold feet for the European project. Poland and the Czech Republic, the latter led by Euro-skeptic Vaclav Klaus, may feel freer to reject the treaty. Though Germany has already approved it, I wonder if France's rejection will leave Germans feeling that they have been left holding the bag. German anxieties about deepening integration are at least as profound as those of the French.
What may hopefully emerge from this mess is an EU premised on European integration without grandiose ambitions of European power. A Europe that accepts difference of opinion and accords more weight to its east and south promises to be a more equitable arrangement - one capable of bringing the grander dreams of integration to fruition at a later point. At the present time it seems clear that European peoples are not thrilled with the idea and certainly that they lack the caliber of leadership to bring it off. Chirac doesn't even come close to meeting the bar; the fact that he has been a leading advocate of deepening the EU shows how far the political classes of Europe have to go before they can be credible builders of transnational institutions.
