Thursday, August 04, 2005
Beyond Niger
The Sahel region has been in the news quite a bit lately. The belated international reaction to famine in Niger has yet to make a substantive impact. A coup in Mauritania has, for one brief moment, lifted that country to the top of headlines.
The desert countries of the Sahel - in particular, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania - constitute an increasingly important region for American foreign policy. Weeks ago, the Washington Post reported on a Pentagon initiative to train armies in Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia. An earlier piece by Robert Kaplan in the Atlantic Monthly profiled one such initiative in Niger, remarking that here US efforts were meeting with more success than they were in neighboring Chad.
Which is not to say that the Chadian initiative has been ineffective. As the Post article recounts, the Chadian army is known to have engaged an Al Qaeda linked group back in March 2004, doggedly chasing them, killing 28 and capturing 7 (the Chadians suffered 20 dead in the effort).
As a basic generalization about the countries of the Sahel - particularly the above four - one can say that they are very large, very poor, and - despite their relatively small populations (Niger is twice Texas' size with half of its population; Mauritania is slightly smaller with only 3 million) - ethnically fragmented. Weak central governments preside with difficulty over vast expanses of territory, with governance made more difficult by ethnic or religious divisions. The presence of uranium in the region - notably in Niger - gives us an added reason to be involved.
If Al Qaeda and similar groups are to be denied vacuums in which to operate, events like the Nigerien famine and the Mauritanian coup must face swift reactions. The Nigerien famine was ignored in the crucial early weeks; this late reaction may be insufficient to avert major loss of life. A success in fighting it would mark real progress in our efforts at public diplomacy - maybe not in Saudi Arabia, but certainly in the Sahel. The coup in Mauritania is more of a question mark - the deposed President Taya was no democrat, but prior coup attempts were staged primarily by Islamists. This is a development that will have to be closely monitored - neither Europe nor the United States could tolerate a new Taliban regime on the Atlantic.
The one plus that we have while operating in this region is that France is heavily invested in it and has its own interest in preserving stability and combating Islamists. In the best case scenario, shared efforts in the Sahel could help to slightly narrow the trans-Atlantic gap. Paris would certainly agree that we ignore this region at our peril.
The desert countries of the Sahel - in particular, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania - constitute an increasingly important region for American foreign policy. Weeks ago, the Washington Post reported on a Pentagon initiative to train armies in Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia. An earlier piece by Robert Kaplan in the Atlantic Monthly profiled one such initiative in Niger, remarking that here US efforts were meeting with more success than they were in neighboring Chad.
Which is not to say that the Chadian initiative has been ineffective. As the Post article recounts, the Chadian army is known to have engaged an Al Qaeda linked group back in March 2004, doggedly chasing them, killing 28 and capturing 7 (the Chadians suffered 20 dead in the effort).
As a basic generalization about the countries of the Sahel - particularly the above four - one can say that they are very large, very poor, and - despite their relatively small populations (Niger is twice Texas' size with half of its population; Mauritania is slightly smaller with only 3 million) - ethnically fragmented. Weak central governments preside with difficulty over vast expanses of territory, with governance made more difficult by ethnic or religious divisions. The presence of uranium in the region - notably in Niger - gives us an added reason to be involved.
If Al Qaeda and similar groups are to be denied vacuums in which to operate, events like the Nigerien famine and the Mauritanian coup must face swift reactions. The Nigerien famine was ignored in the crucial early weeks; this late reaction may be insufficient to avert major loss of life. A success in fighting it would mark real progress in our efforts at public diplomacy - maybe not in Saudi Arabia, but certainly in the Sahel. The coup in Mauritania is more of a question mark - the deposed President Taya was no democrat, but prior coup attempts were staged primarily by Islamists. This is a development that will have to be closely monitored - neither Europe nor the United States could tolerate a new Taliban regime on the Atlantic.
The one plus that we have while operating in this region is that France is heavily invested in it and has its own interest in preserving stability and combating Islamists. In the best case scenario, shared efforts in the Sahel could help to slightly narrow the trans-Atlantic gap. Paris would certainly agree that we ignore this region at our peril.
