Wednesday, November 10, 2004
Weekend at Yasser's
Of Yasser Arafat it must be said that classic line about the old Thane of Cawdor: nothing in his life became him like the leaving it. Arafat lay suspended between worlds while his place of burial was debated in a political argument devoid of any but the most spurious significance. His batty trophy wife even chimed in.
Up to a point, Arafat was a successful publicist for his people. Nothing like a bloody hijacking or massacre to get people's attention. This was what he did best. As a head of state, he was a disaster. He devised corrupt redundant bureaucracies and looked on as they stepped over each other. His people skimmed from the top, middle and bottom - a recent Jim Hoagland column recounts the time when Arafat asked a German banker to give him a loan in cash.
At his core, he was not ever serious about peace and reconciliation. Had he been so, he'd have taken steps to prepare his people for what everyone knew was inevitable: compromise on Jerusalem and a renunciation of return. He never did that. He assured Westerners that his strident appeals to Palestinian nationalism were necessary to maintain his legitimacy. After a while, the guise wore thin and we got the suspicion that we'd been had.
In 1994, Arafat told a South African audience that Oslo was a mere truce on the road to the recovery of all of Palestine. More should have been made of this statement. More, too, should have been made of his rhetorical defense of Hamas in the critical 1995-96 period, when he eulogized the bomber Yahya Ayyash. Had Westerners taken greater heed, they might have been able to brace themselves for Camp David and its aftermath.
At Camp David, Arafat simply refused to make counterproposals (complaints about Barak's opening offer are thus, beside the point). He flat out told his counterparts that Jerusalem had no Jewish history, and therefore belonged to Palestine. Defenses made of his behavior - that he wasn't ready to negotiate so comprehensively - simply don't hold water. The same people fault Ehud Barak for prioritizing the Syrian track and wasting months on that. The argument also forgets the fundamental fact that Arafat was in power from 1993 onward. If he felt rushed in 2000, it could only have come from his failure to prepare his people for the inevitable concessions.
Confronted, he turned back to violence, his own familiar standby. Those who argue for the spontaneity of the outbreak of violence in September overlook the obvious signs of Arafat's preparation - the increasingly aggressive tone of PA propaganda and the en masse release of Hamas prisoners. In the process, he destroyed his last true negotiating partner. Barak's aloofness is well known, but he was ultimately sincere. His negotiating style left much to be desired, but this was an obstacle that Bill Clinton's careful mediation did much to overcome. Clinton's efforts were futile in the face of Arafat's obstinence.
Clinton made some sage observations about Arafat, which can be found in his memoir: the aging revolutionary was "not at the top of his game," unable to make the transition between revolutionary and statesman. He seemed "confused" and not in command of the facts. In their last conversation, Clinton told Arafat "that he was single-handedly electing Sharon and that he would reap the whirlwind. (943-44)"
Whatever the tragedies of the past four years, Arafat got what he deserved in Sharon - an implacable adversary who has progressively humiliated him and reduced him to irrelevance. The last four years have been disastrous, but it was Arafat's intifada that set all this in motion. There is some justice to be found that he will die before the inevitable establishment of a Palestinian state, having callously squandered far better opportunities to establish one.
Arafat is not to be pitied or mourned. The countless innocent victims of his folly - both Palestinian and Israeli - are. Let's hope that Arafat's successors pay more heed to these victims than they do their failed predecessor.
Of Yasser Arafat it must be said that classic line about the old Thane of Cawdor: nothing in his life became him like the leaving it. Arafat lay suspended between worlds while his place of burial was debated in a political argument devoid of any but the most spurious significance. His batty trophy wife even chimed in.
Up to a point, Arafat was a successful publicist for his people. Nothing like a bloody hijacking or massacre to get people's attention. This was what he did best. As a head of state, he was a disaster. He devised corrupt redundant bureaucracies and looked on as they stepped over each other. His people skimmed from the top, middle and bottom - a recent Jim Hoagland column recounts the time when Arafat asked a German banker to give him a loan in cash.
At his core, he was not ever serious about peace and reconciliation. Had he been so, he'd have taken steps to prepare his people for what everyone knew was inevitable: compromise on Jerusalem and a renunciation of return. He never did that. He assured Westerners that his strident appeals to Palestinian nationalism were necessary to maintain his legitimacy. After a while, the guise wore thin and we got the suspicion that we'd been had.
In 1994, Arafat told a South African audience that Oslo was a mere truce on the road to the recovery of all of Palestine. More should have been made of this statement. More, too, should have been made of his rhetorical defense of Hamas in the critical 1995-96 period, when he eulogized the bomber Yahya Ayyash. Had Westerners taken greater heed, they might have been able to brace themselves for Camp David and its aftermath.
At Camp David, Arafat simply refused to make counterproposals (complaints about Barak's opening offer are thus, beside the point). He flat out told his counterparts that Jerusalem had no Jewish history, and therefore belonged to Palestine. Defenses made of his behavior - that he wasn't ready to negotiate so comprehensively - simply don't hold water. The same people fault Ehud Barak for prioritizing the Syrian track and wasting months on that. The argument also forgets the fundamental fact that Arafat was in power from 1993 onward. If he felt rushed in 2000, it could only have come from his failure to prepare his people for the inevitable concessions.
Confronted, he turned back to violence, his own familiar standby. Those who argue for the spontaneity of the outbreak of violence in September overlook the obvious signs of Arafat's preparation - the increasingly aggressive tone of PA propaganda and the en masse release of Hamas prisoners. In the process, he destroyed his last true negotiating partner. Barak's aloofness is well known, but he was ultimately sincere. His negotiating style left much to be desired, but this was an obstacle that Bill Clinton's careful mediation did much to overcome. Clinton's efforts were futile in the face of Arafat's obstinence.
Clinton made some sage observations about Arafat, which can be found in his memoir: the aging revolutionary was "not at the top of his game," unable to make the transition between revolutionary and statesman. He seemed "confused" and not in command of the facts. In their last conversation, Clinton told Arafat "that he was single-handedly electing Sharon and that he would reap the whirlwind. (943-44)"
Whatever the tragedies of the past four years, Arafat got what he deserved in Sharon - an implacable adversary who has progressively humiliated him and reduced him to irrelevance. The last four years have been disastrous, but it was Arafat's intifada that set all this in motion. There is some justice to be found that he will die before the inevitable establishment of a Palestinian state, having callously squandered far better opportunities to establish one.
Arafat is not to be pitied or mourned. The countless innocent victims of his folly - both Palestinian and Israeli - are. Let's hope that Arafat's successors pay more heed to these victims than they do their failed predecessor.
