Saturday, April 17, 2004
A fellow blogger blasts the Israeli Disengagement Plan as "lopsided" and "biased." I think he's missing the real point of the exercise, and I don't think he's being particularly realistic. Allow me to explain.
The notion that the disconnectedness of Gaza and the West Bank makes a Palestinian state nonviable just seems bizarre to me. What is Israel supposed to do to remedy this, cede a land corridor between the two? By the same rule of thumb it would then be strategically unviable - the only safe route between the two halves would involve going around the African continent. Ehud Barak had the right idea when he proposed an elevated highway between the West Bank and Gaza. Strictly speaking, territorial contiguity is not a prerequisite for state viability. Too many states to count have non-contiguous territories. Let's get used to this aspect of the map as it is, particularly in the absence of sound territorial remedies (my colleague names none anyway).
This is being implemented not to immediately bring about a Palestinian state, but as a step on that road. And as a step, it is significant. Political control over the vast majority of the Palestinian population will fall to Palestinians. That alone makes this a big deal. That Israel controls border points is driven by its contention that it lacks a Palestinian negotiating partner, which is ultimately true. Until then, it will want to have some ability to prevent the mass importation of weapons (something that its alleged "partner" has attempted on numerous occasions). Expecting control of ports to be unilaterally passed to the PA at this point is to confuse an intermediate step with a final step.
Hoping for the emergence of a robust Palestinian state at this point in time is remarkably unrealistic. The territorial circumstances on the ground preclude the emergence of a state capable of threatening Israel's security. No one should expect Israel to act in such a way as to create a nemesis-state. And no one should think that Washington would be wise to push Israel into doing otherwise. Many of the states existing today came into existence through a slow assumption of sovereignty. This was particularly true among states in the Balkans, and the British Commonwealth but also - and most relevantly - in the case of Ireland, which began as the Irish Free State, still owing allegiance to the British monarchy, and militarily at the mercy of Britain. Ireland assumed the status of a full republic after a few decades.
The Irish were able to do this because they had an established and stable state structure. Palestinian sovereignty can only come if a Palestinian leadership emerges that is willing to assume the full commitments that a sovereign state must live by. Arafat has notably failed to do that, and no one in their right mind would now consider him a potential negotiating partner. To the fluttering of many hearts, a steady procession of Palestinian moderates has emerged, but each has been largely emasculated by Arafat. A non-emasculated Palestinian prime ministership is a vital and necessary prerequisite to a non-emasculated Palestinian state; to insist otherwise is to dangerously put the cart in front of the horse and invite another war in a few years.
Finally, it really is time that someone punctured the pieties of Palestinian nationalism, just as it was good to have the notion of perpetual Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza punctured. The US does well to reject the "right of return" as the pipe dream that it is. That Palestinian leaders have been fostering this fantasy for decades speaks to their irresponsibility, not to its viability. To the extent that it was responsible for the Oslo breakdown, it's time to acknowledge its clear infeasibility. Israel is not going away and the Palestinians would do well to recognize the fact.
The same may be said about Jerusalem. Barak was willing to contemplate rather remarkable arrangements for sharing the city, but Arafat spat in his face. Granting Arafat Barak's concessions now rewards him for nothing, nor is there a Palestinian state able to act responsibly in administering Jerusalem, nor is the issue ready for negotiation. This is, once again, an intermediate step taken in the absence of a viable (there's that word again) Palestinian negotiating partner. This cannot be a final step and expecting it to live up to that requirement fundamentally underestimates the governmental vacuum on the Palestinian side, and the legitimate security requirements of Israel.
The notion that the disconnectedness of Gaza and the West Bank makes a Palestinian state nonviable just seems bizarre to me. What is Israel supposed to do to remedy this, cede a land corridor between the two? By the same rule of thumb it would then be strategically unviable - the only safe route between the two halves would involve going around the African continent. Ehud Barak had the right idea when he proposed an elevated highway between the West Bank and Gaza. Strictly speaking, territorial contiguity is not a prerequisite for state viability. Too many states to count have non-contiguous territories. Let's get used to this aspect of the map as it is, particularly in the absence of sound territorial remedies (my colleague names none anyway).
This is being implemented not to immediately bring about a Palestinian state, but as a step on that road. And as a step, it is significant. Political control over the vast majority of the Palestinian population will fall to Palestinians. That alone makes this a big deal. That Israel controls border points is driven by its contention that it lacks a Palestinian negotiating partner, which is ultimately true. Until then, it will want to have some ability to prevent the mass importation of weapons (something that its alleged "partner" has attempted on numerous occasions). Expecting control of ports to be unilaterally passed to the PA at this point is to confuse an intermediate step with a final step.
Hoping for the emergence of a robust Palestinian state at this point in time is remarkably unrealistic. The territorial circumstances on the ground preclude the emergence of a state capable of threatening Israel's security. No one should expect Israel to act in such a way as to create a nemesis-state. And no one should think that Washington would be wise to push Israel into doing otherwise. Many of the states existing today came into existence through a slow assumption of sovereignty. This was particularly true among states in the Balkans, and the British Commonwealth but also - and most relevantly - in the case of Ireland, which began as the Irish Free State, still owing allegiance to the British monarchy, and militarily at the mercy of Britain. Ireland assumed the status of a full republic after a few decades.
The Irish were able to do this because they had an established and stable state structure. Palestinian sovereignty can only come if a Palestinian leadership emerges that is willing to assume the full commitments that a sovereign state must live by. Arafat has notably failed to do that, and no one in their right mind would now consider him a potential negotiating partner. To the fluttering of many hearts, a steady procession of Palestinian moderates has emerged, but each has been largely emasculated by Arafat. A non-emasculated Palestinian prime ministership is a vital and necessary prerequisite to a non-emasculated Palestinian state; to insist otherwise is to dangerously put the cart in front of the horse and invite another war in a few years.
Finally, it really is time that someone punctured the pieties of Palestinian nationalism, just as it was good to have the notion of perpetual Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza punctured. The US does well to reject the "right of return" as the pipe dream that it is. That Palestinian leaders have been fostering this fantasy for decades speaks to their irresponsibility, not to its viability. To the extent that it was responsible for the Oslo breakdown, it's time to acknowledge its clear infeasibility. Israel is not going away and the Palestinians would do well to recognize the fact.
The same may be said about Jerusalem. Barak was willing to contemplate rather remarkable arrangements for sharing the city, but Arafat spat in his face. Granting Arafat Barak's concessions now rewards him for nothing, nor is there a Palestinian state able to act responsibly in administering Jerusalem, nor is the issue ready for negotiation. This is, once again, an intermediate step taken in the absence of a viable (there's that word again) Palestinian negotiating partner. This cannot be a final step and expecting it to live up to that requirement fundamentally underestimates the governmental vacuum on the Palestinian side, and the legitimate security requirements of Israel.
