Thursday, September 25, 2003
Ignore Germany?
Gerhard Schroeder's recent Op-Ed in the New York Times, Germany Will Share the Burden in Iraq, highlights the real missed opportunity experienced by the Bush administration in its approaches to Europe before the war.
I have no pretensions that France was a potential partner with Iraq. Chirac's own personal connection to Saddam and France's history of voting in Iraq's favor, be the issue at question sanctions or treatment of the Kurdish northern area speaks for itself. But Germany was and is a different story.
Germany's own intelligence service, the BND, reported on several occasions about the extent of Iraqi weapons programs. In 2001, the BND reported that Iraq would be able to launch nuclear missiles at its neighbors within 3 years. This is quite a thing to read in our jaded post-April mindset, but it bears mentioning.
France and Germany tend to be lumped together as opponents of the war. In fact there was some daylight between them. On the issue of allowing NATO aid to Turkey France was intransigent and Germany ultimately cooperative. France was the state that attempted to bully Eastern Europe over its support of the US. Germany has attempted to compensate in other spheres of its relationship with us for damage done by opposition to the war - bolstering its commitment to peacekeeping in Afghanistan for example. One of the most passionately pro-American politicians in Europe is Germany's Joschka Fischer, whose support for our campaign in Kosovo led to him being physically assaulted.
And, as Schroeder does mention, he faced a no confidence vote over sending troops to Afghanistan. The extent of German pacifism is a factor worth considering, when his actions are viewed.
My suspicion is that Team Bush, which has a real knack for remembering slights, was stung deeply by Schroeder's campaigning against the war last fall, and also by the tastleless comparison that his justice minister, Herta Daeubler-Gmelin made between Bush and Hitler. Schroder did eventually dismiss Daeubler-Gmelin.
French anti-Americanism taps into a deep vein of sentiment. The German side of this phenomenon is far more recent in origin and springs from more intellectually genuine roots - namely Germany's deep fascination with pacifism and deep sensitity to nationalism. Germans I know are deeply troubled by the extent of nationalism they see in the US. I don't agree with the sentiment, but it seems neither a dishonest nor unreasonable statement.
Condi Rice's earlier formula of "forgive Russia, ignore Germany, punish France" is one in dire need of amendment. I'm glad to read that Bush and Schroeder have met and announced their mutual rapprochement. With real effort, I think Germany could be engaged to an extent that would frustrate French schemes to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. Give it a shot already.
Gerhard Schroeder's recent Op-Ed in the New York Times, Germany Will Share the Burden in Iraq, highlights the real missed opportunity experienced by the Bush administration in its approaches to Europe before the war.
I have no pretensions that France was a potential partner with Iraq. Chirac's own personal connection to Saddam and France's history of voting in Iraq's favor, be the issue at question sanctions or treatment of the Kurdish northern area speaks for itself. But Germany was and is a different story.
Germany's own intelligence service, the BND, reported on several occasions about the extent of Iraqi weapons programs. In 2001, the BND reported that Iraq would be able to launch nuclear missiles at its neighbors within 3 years. This is quite a thing to read in our jaded post-April mindset, but it bears mentioning.
France and Germany tend to be lumped together as opponents of the war. In fact there was some daylight between them. On the issue of allowing NATO aid to Turkey France was intransigent and Germany ultimately cooperative. France was the state that attempted to bully Eastern Europe over its support of the US. Germany has attempted to compensate in other spheres of its relationship with us for damage done by opposition to the war - bolstering its commitment to peacekeeping in Afghanistan for example. One of the most passionately pro-American politicians in Europe is Germany's Joschka Fischer, whose support for our campaign in Kosovo led to him being physically assaulted.
And, as Schroeder does mention, he faced a no confidence vote over sending troops to Afghanistan. The extent of German pacifism is a factor worth considering, when his actions are viewed.
My suspicion is that Team Bush, which has a real knack for remembering slights, was stung deeply by Schroeder's campaigning against the war last fall, and also by the tastleless comparison that his justice minister, Herta Daeubler-Gmelin made between Bush and Hitler. Schroder did eventually dismiss Daeubler-Gmelin.
French anti-Americanism taps into a deep vein of sentiment. The German side of this phenomenon is far more recent in origin and springs from more intellectually genuine roots - namely Germany's deep fascination with pacifism and deep sensitity to nationalism. Germans I know are deeply troubled by the extent of nationalism they see in the US. I don't agree with the sentiment, but it seems neither a dishonest nor unreasonable statement.
Condi Rice's earlier formula of "forgive Russia, ignore Germany, punish France" is one in dire need of amendment. I'm glad to read that Bush and Schroeder have met and announced their mutual rapprochement. With real effort, I think Germany could be engaged to an extent that would frustrate French schemes to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. Give it a shot already.
